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There is little doubt that the ongoing event of COVID-19 pandemic has caught the world 
by surprise, similar to a “black swan” event with the characteristics of unexpected occurrence 
and severe consequence (Telab, 2007). The current pandemic started in a single location, but 
rapidly spread to the whole world on both spatial and temporal dimensions. This commentary 
explores two issues. First, what are the underlying causes of this “black swan” event and its 
consequences? Second, what can be learned from this crisis for organizations to be more 
resilient in the future (see Linnenluecke, 2017; Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, & 
Zhao, 2017, for recent reviews)? 
  
Organizational resilience refers to a special organizational capability to prepare for, 
respond to, and learn from adverse events (including crisis as an unexpected but severe 
adverse event) so as to bounce back for survival in the short run and also bounce forward for 
thriving over time. This definition covers all associated notions with all adverse events as the 
central antecedent; preparing, responding and learning as the core mechanisms across three 
stages, and surviving and thriving as the primary outcomes, thus an integrative input-process-
output framework of resilience at the organizational level.  
 
This commentary is built upon two core assumptions. The first assumption is that this 
pandemic is just one of crises as part of an emerging “new normal” as delineated by the 
contextual features of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). The 
second assumption is that interdependence bears both positive and negative effects, and the 
opposite sides jointly constitute the paradox of interdependence, especially in the context of 
globalization, such as the interplay between global integration and local differentiation 
(Eriksen, 2014; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). From the perspective of yin-yang balancing (Li, 
2014), paradox can be framed as partially conflicting and partially complementary between 
opposite elements (e.g., threat-opportunity context, and central-peripheral vision). 
 
Major Causes of Current Crisis 
 
Concerning the underlying causes of this “black swan” event and its consequences, this 
commentary focuses on two factors: tight coupling in interdependence and overconcentration 
of supply. The two factors are interrelated with the former as the primary and the latter as the 
secondary concerning the vulnerability of global interdependence. Since the positive side of 
global interdependence is well-known, we focus on the ignored dark side as rooted not much 
in the magnitude of global interdependence, but primarily in its current form or pattern. 
 
The first underlying cause of the current crisis is the tightly coupled form of global 
interdependence. It is argued that the excessive tight coupling of diverse nations in the global 
network is to blame for the fast and wide spread of COVID-19 along the global network due 
to the massive cross-border travelers, and the shortage of medical supplies in the world due to 
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the extremely interconnected supply chains for components across the world with “cut-to-
bone” dependency on outsourcing, thus little buffer for sudden shock. Such problems vividly 
reflect the well-known “butterfly effect” in the chao and complexity theories (Gleick, 1987). 
In this sense, everybody in the world is more or less equally and collectively vulnerable due 
to the tightly coupled global interdependence. This can be illustrated by a historical war in 
the era of the Warring States in the post-Han Dynasty (220-280 AD). When the Northern 
state tried to attack the Southern state by crossing the Yangzi River, the Northern army 
chained all the boats so as to stabilize them for the Northern soldiers who easily got seasick 
with the rocking boats. However, the tightly chained boats created the vulnerability of being 
attacked by fire from the Southern navy, which resulted in the major defeat of the massive 
Northern army by the small Southern navy. This shows the negative effect of tight coupling 
on resilience: when one component in the system encounters a problem, the rest are incapable 
of avoiding the same setback. Further, tight coupling increases system rigidity as the former 
is often associated with centralization, formalization, standardization, and integration, thus 
further hurting resilience (Orton & Weick, 1990; also see Zhou, this Forum).  
 
Directly related to the above point, the second underlying cause of the current problem is 
the overconcentration of global supply in one or very few locations, which exacerbates the 
negative effect of tightly coupled interdependence in the global network. For example, as the 
so-called “factory of the world”, China has an overwhelming concentration of supply chains 
in most, if not all, manufacturing clusters, for the rest of the world markets. The mix of tight 
coupling in global interdependence and overconcentration of global supply, reflected by the 
lack of slack or buffer in the medical supply at home, further exacerbates the negative impact 
of the current pandemic. As reported by New Yorker (Mukherjee, 2020), the acute lack of 
medical supplies in US is largely the result of cost-cutting measures by many US providers, 
who have outsourced from China as pushed by the competitive-bidding programs, while 
about half of such firms have gone out of business. The similar situation is in the case of 
medical drugs. Under these conditions, if China fails to export, the rest of the world is bound 
to suffer from the shortage of essential supplies. 
 
Further, the above two interrelated problems appear to derive from the finance-obsessed 
business model rooted in the “liberal market capitalism” (e.g., US and UK), in contrast to that 
of “coordinated market capitalism” (e.g., Germany and Japan), as discussed in the research 
on the varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskis, 2001). Underlying the current problems of tight 
coupling in global interdependence and overconcentration of global supply due to short-term 
cost minimization, this finance-biased version of capitalism tends to hurt resilience at all 
levels. Hence, we call for a renewed debate over the diverse versions of capitalism, especially 
the balance between opposite features of multiple versions (Witt & Jackson, 2016; also see 
Redding, this Forum; Zhou, this Forum).  
 
Potential Solutions to Future Crises 
 
For the lessens we learn from this crisis, we offer two solutions to address the problems 
of tight coupling and overconcentration. First, we need to redesign the current configuration 
of global interdependence from a tightly coupled system to a loosely coupled one. At the 
organizational level, the effect of interdependence on resilience is concerned with the balance 
between the need for interdependence and that for autonomy in both internal and external 
links. Second, we also need to shift from overconcentration of global supply in one location 
(often rooted in tight coupling) to diversified sources, at both national and organizational 
levels. Take Toyota as an example, after two disruptive events in the forms of factory fire in 
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1997 and earthquake in 2011, which cut off its supply of crucial parts, Toyota learned the 
value of loose coupling in interdependence in its supply chain (Mukherjee, 2020). It modified 
its just-in-time system to allow for at least a month’s worth of specialized components, thus 
building strategic slack into its operation; further, it also created a database, called RESCUE, 
with supplies grouped into different tiers, their risks regularly evaluated in terms of potential 
adversity, and finally information about almost seven thousand parts continually updated; 
finally, it trains its employees how to react during disasters. In short, Toyota proactively 
manages the risks to the entire system if any node in the supply network fails. 
 
The most critical type of slack does not take the form of hardware or physical stock, but 
software in terms of mindset and soft capability. As Weick (1993: 641) pointed out, “extreme 
confidence and extreme caution both can destroy what organizations most need in changing 
times, namely, curiosity, openness, and complex sensing…It is this sense in which wisdom, 
which avoids extremes, improves adaptability.” Specifically, four major sources of resilience 
can be identified (Weick, 1993), (1) improvisation and bricolage; (2) virtual role systems; (3) 
attitude of wisdom, and (4) norms of respectful interaction. It seems that the above sources of 
resilience are all related to the notion of loose coupling (as a dialectical balance between 
collective responsiveness and individual distinctiveness, Orton & Weick, 1990) in the sense 
that loose coupling can enable resilience.  
 
Consistent with the perspective of yin-yang balancing (Li, 2014), in contrast to the view 
of structural ambidexterity that paradoxical elements must be separated in different locations, 
loose coupling explains “the simultaneous existence of rationality and indeterminacy without 
specializing these two logics in distinct locations,” so “loose coupling suggests that any 
location in an organization (top, middle, or bottom) contains interdependent elements that 
vary in the number and strength of their interdependencies. The fact that these elements are 
linked and preserve some degree of determinacy is captured by the word coupled in the 
phrase loosely coupled. The fact that these elements are also subject to spontaneous changes 
and preserve some degree of independence and indeterminacy is captured by the modifying 
word loosely. The resulting image is a system that is simultaneously open and closed, 
indeterminate and rational, spontaneous and deliberate” (Orton & Weick, 1990: 204-205). 
For example, loose coupling as a balanced approach to organizational paradoxes enables 
resilience by providing a structural support for self-organized improvising and bricolage. 
Bricoleurs remain creative under pressures, precisely because they routinely act in chaotic 
conditions and pull order out of chaos with the innovative mixes of available resources at 
hand (Baker & Nelson, 2005), often via creative improvisation, especially in the context of 
emerging economies with resource constraints (Li, Zhou, & Yang, 2020).  
 
According to Weick (1976), there are several benefits of loose coupling in contrast to 
tight coupling (1) it allows some components of an organization to persist without the need to 
adjust in the face of contextual changes; (2) it provides a sensitive sensing mechanism; (3) it 
permits a localized adaptation with the flexibility of partial change without disrupt the whole 
system; (4) it preserves the identity, uniqueness, and separateness of some elements so that 
the system can retain a richer variety with potentially novel solutions; (5) it makes the system 
intact by sealing off one part of the system suffers a breakdown; (6) it allows more room for 
self-determination and self-organization; and (7) it reduces the cost of managing a complex 
system by minimizing the costly effort to coordinate diverse elements. A good example is the 
watertight compartment in a ship, an indigenous invention in the ancient China. 
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Put differently, there are three key effects of loose coupling: modularity, requisite variety, 
and discretion (Orton & Weick, 1990), all required in the VUCA context for organizational 
resilience by enhancing agility and innovation not only to survive but also to thrive. First, 
loose coupling enhances the modularity for persistence and buffering in a system, while tight 
coupling reduces it. Second, loose coupling is more capable of matching the VUCA context 
through requisite variety for agile and versatile adaptation. Third, loose coupling enables two 
forms of discretion: behavioral discretion is the capacity for agile autonomy, while cognitive 
discretion is the freedom to frame something from diverse perspectives. The latter is related 
to the notion of peripheral vision for vigilant leadership as sensitive to weak signals of both 
threats and opportunities (Day & Schoemaker, 2006). This can be reinforced by a strong 
sense of crisis among “paranoid” leaders (Grove, 1999), such as the founders of Huawei and 
Haier. This threat-vigilant leadership is deeply rooted in the Chinese traditional culture as 
reflected in the old saying, “be alert to threat in time of security” (居安思危 in Chinese), but 
this is clearly lost in China’s state in recent years (Zhou, this Forum ). Hence, loose coupling 
can address both problems of tightly coupled global interdependence and overconcentration 
of global supply, especially via self-organized local adaptation, modularized local supply 
(e.g., 3D printing), and contextualized local innovation, primarily in a bottom-up process. 
 
Applying the view of loose coupling to the current pandemic, a lower-order resilience in 
term of bouncing back for survival can take the format of incremental innovation upon the 
agility and versatility of resources in the form of improvising and bricolage, such as business 
swap (e.g., the shift from producing cars or auto parts to ventilators or face masks); cross-
business cooperation (e.g. sharing workforce by moving oversupplied functions to 
undersupplied ones, such as from waiter to delivery-man initiated by Alibaba), and also 
crowdsourcing for new products or services (e.g., turning cargo containers into medical 
wards for COVID-19 patients and also virus-cleaning air-conditioners, both by Haier).  
  
Further, the higher-order resilience in terms of bouncing forward for thriving (taking the 
crisis as the great moment of “unfreezing” for transformation in the following areas: (1) 
digital transformation; (2) greater regionalization and some localization of supply chains; (3) 
dual or even more sourcing; (4) balanced supply from both external and internal sources; (5)  
workforce cross-training; (6) redesigning organizational structure with three distributive ends 
for co-opetition in an open-ended platform-enabled ecosystem: self-organized agile front-end 
team; modularized robust central-end hub, and open-minded foresighted back-end HQ (3-End 
Architecture, cf. Galbraith, 2010; also see Grandori, this Forum). 
 
Taking the case of China’s reforms in the late 1970s led by Xiaoping Deng, we can see 
that this reform clearly reflects the benefits of loose coupling in terms of an implicit federal 
system of governance at two levels: (1) a division of labor between the central and the local 
states agencies with a critical interplay between top-down strategic direction and bottom-up 
tactical discretion, and (2) a division of labor between diverse local state agencies to compete 
for resources from both the central state agencies and emerging market forces (Li, 2005). The 
Chinese history shows, when the central state adopts the policy of loose coupling with a good  
balance between centralization and decentralization, China will enjoy prosperity; whenever 
the balance is off, either too much centralization with little discretion at the bottom, or too 
much decentralization with little shared direction, China will suffer (Zhou, 2017, this Forum; 
also see Redding, this Forum). Further, this national pattern is reflected at the organizational 
level, as in the case of Haier with CEO’s broad calls and employees’ concrete responses 
(Lewin, Välikangas, & Chen, 2017), and also applicable to academic research as a balance 
between universal and indigenous perspectives (March, 2005). It is imperative to have a 
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balance between differentiation (often via bottom-up processes) and integration (often via 
top-down processes) at and cross multiple levels (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), including its 
salient implications for overcoming the middle-income trap (Lewin, Kenney, & Murmann, 
2016). 
 
In sum, we should avoid the polarized extremes of either tight coupling or decoupling in 
favor of loose coupling to various degrees so as to effectively manage the paradox of global 
interdependence, with an asymmetrical balance between moderately tighter coupling in some 
aspects at certain times (e.g., cultural values, historical legacies, shared information, shared 
platform/ecosystem, collective learning, joint action, and focal vision; at the stage of initial 
response to crisis with quick reaction and fast adjustment) and moderately looser coupling in 
other aspects at other times (e.g., local slack, multi-site sourcing, flexible/nimble capabilities, 
diversity for innovation/creativity, and peripheral vision; at the pre-crisis stage of preparation 
with alertness and readiness, and the stage of later bouncing back in the shortest time and 
bouncing forward in the greatest scope). Future research is needed to verify the salient effects 
of loose coupling on organizational resilience at and across different levels, including the 
curvilinear links between paradoxical elements. 
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